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Stagnation and Neoliberal Capitalism
Six years ago the National Bureau of Economic Research declared the 2007-2009 Great 
Recession over.  
Yet, the announced end of the Great Recession was not followed by economic good 
times: excess productive capacity, unemployment and underemployment, and stagnant 
wages still to this day bedevil the economy. The weak nature of the recovery has led 
prominent economists, such as Laurence Summers, to claim that the U.S. economy is 
potentially facing a prolonged period of stagnation: “The nature of macroeconomics 
has changed dramatically in the last seven years. Now, instead of being concerned with 
minor adjustments to stabilize about a given trend, concern is focused on avoiding 
secular stagnation” (“U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the 
Zero Lower Bound,” Business Economics, 2014, vol. 49, no. 2.) 
This is not an unreasonable claim, despite the controversy it has generated. After 
Students Present Research on 
Minimum Wage and Austerity
Dakota Hughes, a senior economics major, presented his research at the 29th Annual 
CSU Student Research Competition held on May 1, 2015. Dakota qualified for this 
event by being selected by the Oﬃce of Student Research based on his performance at 
CSUSB’s student research competition on February 27th. Dakota’s project is titled “The 
Impact of the Minimum Wage on California Labor Markets: A Continuous Counties 
Approach,” and was produced with the advice of Professor Daniel MacDonald. 
Dakota compared changes in unemployment in counties in Oregon, Nevada, and 
Arizona that did not see a minimum wage increase to changes in similar (bordering) 
counties in California that did see a minimum wage increase. Dakota will be com-
peting with other CSUSB students and over 200 other students from the entire CSU 
system. 
Clinton Haywood (economics student), Kangwook Noh (economics graduate), 
and Catherine Ou (economics and mathematics student), will be presenting at this 
year’s “Meeting of the Minds,” a research symposium held on Thursday, May 21st 
through the Oﬃce of Student Research. Their presentation will be based on work they 
did last summer with Professor Daniel MacDonald, titled “Estimating the Eﬀects of 
Austerity: A Contribution to Empirical Macroeconomics.” 
In their project, they used time series econometric methods to estimate the impact 
of reduced government spending (also known as “austerity”) on GDP growth after the 
phase-out of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in mid-2011. 
The Oﬃce of Student Research encourages you to check out what promises to be an 
exciting and event-filled day in the SMSU.
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If you’re receiving the Coyote Economist, then you’re on our mailing list and everything is as it should be. But, if you know 
of an Economics Major, or an Econ Fellow Traveler, who is not receiving the Coyote Economist through email, then please 
have him/her inform our Administrative Support Coordinator, Ms. Jacqueline Carrillo, or the Chair of the Economics De-
partment, Professor Mayo Toruño. Our phone number is 909-537-5511. 
 You can stay informed by consulting:
 Our Website - http://economics.csusb.edu/
 Our Facebook Page- http://www.facebook.com/pages/CSUSB-Department-of-Economics/109500729082841
 Chair of the Economics Department – mtoruno@csusb.edu
This year’s Commencement will be held on June 20, 2015, at the Citizens Business 
Bank Arena (CBBA) in Ontario, CA. This is the first time commencement will be 
held at that venue.The growing number of students has forced the University to 
seek a bigger venue, thus the choice of CBBA. 
Students majoring in Economics, Political Economy, Mathematical Economics, 
or Appled Economics will participate in the College of Social and Behavioral 
Science Commencement at Citizens Bank Arena on Saturday, June 20, at 8:00 a.m. 
Students majoring in Business Administration with a concentration in Business 
Economics will participate in the College of Business and Public Administration 
Commencement also to be held at CBBA on Saturday, June 20, 2015, at 8:00 p.m. 
Commencement
All students are encouraged to attend 
our annual Seniors’ Reception to be held 
on Friday, June 12, 2015, at 4:30 p.m. in 
SB-302B. All graduating seniors will be 
honored at this event. In addition, we will 
be celebrating students graduating with 
honors, students that have won Economic 
Scholarships for the next academic year, 
and students who were inducted into the 
Alpha Delta chapter of Omicron Delta 
Epsilon. Students are encouraged to bring 
their family and friends. 
After the Seniors Reception, the 
Department of Economics will be hosting 
its world-famous End-of-the-Year Party on 
Friday, June 12, at 6 p.m. at Jerseys Pizza. 
All econ students, as well as friends and 
family, are encouraged to attend. If you 
haven’t attended one of our parties, you 
should; not only do you get free pizza and 
beverages, you get to meet the econ faculty 
and other econ students. These events are 
always fun.
Coussoulis Arena at CSUSB
Citizens Business Bank Arena 
in Ontario
Staying Informed of CSUSB Department of Economics Events and News
Ø
So...where is commencement?
Seniors’ Reception, Awards 
Ceremony, and Pizza Party!
We’re Still on 
Facebook!
Joining us on Facebook is an 
important way of keeping up with 
Departmental news and events, 
as well as getting information on 
political economy.
Simply search for The CSUSB 
Department of Economics on 
Facebook and you’ll find us. We’re 
easy to find. If you’ve not already 
done this, do it today!
3all, the gap between actual output 
(real GDP) and potential output (a 
measure of the “full employment” level 
of real GDP) remains large, casting, in 
the words of Summers, “a substantial 
shadow on the economy’s future 
potential.” 
Figure 1 (at right) shows the 
relationship between actual and 
potential real GDP from 1991 to the 
first quarter of 2015. As can be seen, 
the gap between actual and potential 
real output has been substantial and 
enduring since 2007. And, while the 
gap has diminished it is still high by 
historical standards. For example, from 
1949 until the first quarter of 2015, the 
gap between actual and potential real 
GDP was, on average, 0.62% below 
potential. Yet, in the first quarter of 
this year, the gap was relatively huge 
4% below potential (these estimates 
obtained from CBOs February 2014 
report The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: 2014 to 2024 and NIPA Table 
1.1.6). 
The current discussion regarding 
the possibility of secular stagnation is 
an awkward one, given the standard 
assumption accepted by many 
mainstream economists that capitalism 
has an automatic tendency to move 
toward full employment. 
Yet, a long-standing heterodox 
tradition—going back to John 
Maynard Keynes’ General Theory 
(1936) and, more tellingly, Karl Marx’s 
Capital (1867)—holds that the system 
is not stable and does not have an 
automatic tendency to move toward 
full employment. That’s not to say 
that full employment is impossible, 
just that it is only one of numerous 
possibilities. It’s plausible to claim, 
based on empirical observation, 
that unemployment equilibriums 
are occasionally encountered, and 
when encountered may persist 
for long periods. What’s more, as 
Continued from page 1
Stagnation
John Robinson noted in both The 
Accumulation of Capital (1956) and 
Essays in the Theory of Economic 
Growth (1963), no reason exists to 
presume that the system is stable and 
grows along a full employment path. 
The patterns of growth that capitalist 
economies achieve depend on a host 
of institutional factors that seldom 
guarantee a golden age of economic 
growth with full employment and 
stable income shares.  
David M. Kotz’s recent book The 
Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism 
(2015) reflects this alternative 
tradition. It explores the patterns of 
growth in the US economy since the 
end of World War II, focusing on the 
emergence, history, and possible future 
of the “neoliberal order,” which began 
in the late 1970s. 
Kotz explores this history through 
the lens of the social structure of 
accumulation theory, which claims 
that each era of economic growth 
can be explained by reference to a set 
of institutions (such as the legal and 
regulatory environment, and informal 
arrangements among capitalists and 
between capitalists and workers) 
that promote a particular pattern of 
profitability and capital accumulation. 
When a social structure of 
accumulation is widely accepted, 
economic relationships—particularly 
between capitalists and workers—are 
stable, allowing for a relatively long 
era of economic growth. The pattern 
of growth, employment, and income 
shares characteristic of that era last 
for a few decades but inevitably give 
way to a period of stagnation and 
crisis, when the existing institutional 
framework becomes increasingly 
incompatible with the income seeking 
activity of capitalists and/or workers. 
During the latter period of 
stagnation and crisis, regulations and 
laws are fashioned with the intent of 
overcoming the crisis and creating 
a new framework through which a 
new era of profitability and capital 
accumulation can once again reign. 
Since the end of World War II, the 
U.S.A. has experienced two distinct 
eras of economic growth, that is, 
two distinct social structures of 
accumulation. 
The first era, now referred to as the 
Golden Age, lasted from the end of 
World War II until the 1970s. It was a 
continued on page 4
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time of robust, and shared, economic 
growth.
The second era—referred to as the 
Neoliberal Era—started in the 1970s 
and is still a part of the political 
economic landscape. The patterns of 
growth during these two eras are quite 
distinct. In comparing the Golden Age 
to the Neoliberal Era the following 
patterns stand out: the economy 
grew faster during the Golden Age 
than during the Neoliberal Era, labor 
productivity and wages grew faster—
and were more closely aligned—
during the Golden Age than during 
the Neoliberal Era, unemployment 
and underemployment were lower 
during the Golden Age than during 
the Neoliberal Era, income inequality 
was stable and less unequal during 
the Golden Age than during the 
Neoliberal Era, and financial crisis and 
asset bubbles did not occur during the 
Golden Age, but have been a recurring 
feature of the Neoliberal Era.
The Golden Age was characterized 
by an expanding social welfare state, 
investments in public infrastruc-
ture (such as public education and 
highways), support of labor unions 
(worker rights, and collective bargain-
ing), regulation of basic industries (in 
particular, transportation, energy, and 
finance), regulation of product and job 
safety, regulation of business impact 
on the environment, antitrust enforce-
ment, higher taxes on capital and the 
rich, and Keynesian inspired fiscal and 
monetary policy. 
On the other hand, the Neoliberal 
Continued from page 3
Stagnation Era has been characterized by consistent 
eﬀorts to reduce or eliminate the social 
welfare state, reduced investment in 
public infrastructure while privatizing 
public services, undermining or 
attacking labor unions and collective 
bargaining, deregulation of basic 
industries (transportation, energy 
and finance), deregulation of product 
and job safety, minimizing the impact 
of business on the environment, 
weakening anti-trust enforcement, 
lower taxes on capital and the rich, 
and conservative inspired (Monetarist, 
Supply side, and Real Business Cycle) 
fiscal and monetary policy (Kotz, 
chapters 2 & 3). 
Figure 2 (below) shows one impact 
of these two diﬀerent social structures 
of accumulation. As can be seen, the 
Figure 2
3.9
2.7
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Percent Real GDP Annual Percent Change, 1947-2014
continued on page 5
5average annual rate of increase in real 
GDP was 3.9% during the Golden Age. 
But, since that period, real GDP has 
increased at an average annual rate of 
only 2.7%. What’s more, at the same 
time that the rate of growth has slowed 
down during the Neoliberal Era, the 
downturns have been more dramatic 
than during the Golden Age. 
At the same time, as can be seen 
in Figure 3 (right), the average 
monthly rate of unemployment 
was 4.77% during the Golden Age 
but has averaged 6.5% during the 
Neoliberal Era. The frequency of severe 
unemployment has also been greater 
during the Neoliberal Era than during 
the Golden Age.
In the first decade of the Neoliberal 
Era, Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon, 
and Thomas E. Weisskopf (“Business 
Ascendancy and Economic Impasse: 
A Structural Retrospective on 
Conservative Economics 1979-1987,” 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
3, no.1, (Winter 1989): 107-145) 
argued that the shift toward neoliberal 
economics was motivated by the 
decline in relative economic power 
capitalists began to experience in the 
mid- to late-1960s. 
The Golden Age began to atrophy 
as the rate of profit began to decline 
in the mid 1960s. This was followed 
in the 1970s by rising unit cost and 
reductions in the market power of core 
sector firms. In an attempt to restore 
profitability, corporate capitalists and 
their political allies moved toward 
dismantling government programs 
perceived as responsible for the decline 
in their relative power while attacking 
labor unions and collective bargaining. 
The result of these neoliberal 
policies was a restoration of capitalist 
power brought about in large measure 
by preventing wages from growing in 
tandem with productivity, allowing the 
diﬀerence to flow to capitalists in the 
form of profits. 
Figure 4 (below, derived from updated 
data for Susan Fleck, John Glaser and 
Shawn Sprague ,“The compensation-
productivity gap: a visual essay” in the 
Monthly Labor Review January 2011) 
shows how labor productivity and 
real labor compensation has behaved 
during both eras. As can be seen, 
productivity and labor compensation 
grew at similar rates during the Golden 
Age. From 1947 to 1973 productivity 
grew at an average annual rate of 
2.8% while labor compensation grew 
at an average annual rate of 2.6%. 
But during the Neoliberal Era, both 
productivity and labor grew at slower 
rates and, what’s more, the gap between 
productivity and labor compensation 
widened. During this latter era, 
productivity grew at an average annual 
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6 7
rate of 1.8% while labor compensation 
grew at an average annual rate of 0.9%.
It’s important to note that Figure 4 
measures total labor compensation; 
that is, it includes the wages and 
compensation of corporate CEOs. 
If we were to narrow our focus to 
only production and nonsupervisory 
workers the gap between productivity 
and wages, during the Neoliberal 
Era, would be much greater. The real 
average hourly wage of production 
and nonsupervisory workers, in 2014 
dollars, reached a peak of $22 in 1972 
and has yet to catch up to that level. 
By 2014 the real average hourly wage 
of production and nonsupervisory 
workers stood at $20.60, $1.40 per 
hour less than was being earned in real 
terms in 1972. 
Figure 5 (below) displays the 
movements in the real wages of 
production and nonsupervisory 
workers (from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics series CES0500000008 and 
CUUR0000SA0 adjusted to 2014 as 
the base year). The peak in 1972 and 
the failure of wages to ever regain this 
peak is made obvious in this figure.
Figure 6 (next page) shows yet 
more releant data: the profit/wage 
ratio, before and after taxes, in the 
nonfinancial corporate sector (derived 
from NIPA Table 1.14, profits are 
measured as the sum of corporate 
profits and net interest while wages 
are measured by compensation of 
employees). The profit/wage ratio 
Stagnation
Continued from page 5
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is related to Marx’s rate of surplus 
value, the amount of surplus income 
generated per dollar spent on labor. 
Note that, after declining during 
the end of the Golden Age, the profit/
wage ratio began its upward trend in 
the 1990s and continued growing even 
after the Great Recession of 2007-2009.
Kotz notes that the 20.4% increase 
in the rate of profit from 1979 to 
2007 (not shown here) was due to 
an increase in the share of after-tax 
profit in net income. What’s more, 
84% of the increase in the after-tax 
profit share was due to a declining 
wage share brought on by the growing 
gap between labor productivity 
and employee compensation (Kotz, 
88-89). This is consistent with the 
wage and productivity trends noted 
Figure 5
continued on page 7
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above. In addition, these same trends 
(the growing gap between labor 
productivity and wages along with the 
growing profit/wage ratio) help explain, 
in large measure, the growing income 
inequality which the U.S.A. has been 
experiencing in the Neoliberal Era. 
When combined with the growing 
deregulation of the financial sector, 
the growth in the profit/wage ratio 
helps explain not only the growing 
inequity of the Neoliberal Era but the 
growing incidence of risky financial 
activities and large asset bubbles. As 
noted earlier, asset bubbles were not 
experienced during the Golden Age, 
but they’ve been a recurring feature of 
the Neoliberal Era (Kotz, pp. 103-106). 
While profitability was largely 
restored during the Neoliberal Era, 
much of that surplus income was 
channeled into financial speculation 
(as a result of the growing deregulation 
of the financial sector). And while 
some of that surplus went into 
investment in new productive capacity, 
the rate at which productive capacity 
could grow would ultimately be 
constrained by the slow growing or 
stagnant wages of workers. 
And yet, consumption spending 
did grow during the Neoliberal Era. 
However, the growth in consumption 
was not due to wages, it was instead 
due to the growth in debt which 
skyrocketed during the Neoliberal 
Era. In the absence of wage growth, 
worker consumption could only be 
financed through extra debt; which in 
turn was made possible by the growing 
availability of a wide array of debt 
instruments (home equity loans, credit 
cards, and new mortgage instruments). 
The Great Recession of 2007-2009, 
and the sluggish recovery since then, 
can be seen as a structural crisis of 
Neoliberal capitalism. The rising 
inequality of the Neoliberal Era, the 
recurring asset bubbles (with the most 
recent one being the housing bubble 
preceding the Great Recession), the 
expansion of new and risky financial 
instruments, and the growth in 
excess productive capacity, led to the 
currently stagnation.
How the U.S. economy develops 
from here is as yet undetermined. A 
continuation of the Neoliberal Era 
seems possible, but other alternatives, 
perhaps one based on more equally 
shared economic growth, might also 
be possible with a significant change in 
political conditions.
Figure 6
8Tentative WINTER 2016 SCHEDULE OF COURSES
# TITLE DAYS HOURS AM/PM INSTRUCTOR
104 ECON OF SOCIAL ISSUES TR 0800-0950 AM NILSSON
200 PRINCIPLES MICROECON MW 1000-1150 AM ASHEGHIAN
200 PRINCIPLES MICROECON TR 1200-0150 PM KONYAR
200 PRINCIPLES MICROECON TR 0200-0350 PM KONYAR
200 PRINCIPLES MICROECON ONLINE ALDANA
202 PRINCIPLES MACROECON MW 0400-0550 PM PIERCE
202 PRINCIPLES MACROECON TR 1000-1150 AM PIERCE
202 PRINCIPLES MACROECON TR 0200-0350 PM MACDONALD
202 PRINCIPLES MACROECON ONLINE ALDANA
300 INTERMEDIATE MACROECON MW 0600-0750 PM PIERCE
302 INTERMEDIATE MICROECON TR 0400-0550 PM STAFF
311 ECON K-8 ONLINE CHARKINS
322 MANAGERIAL ECON TR 0600-0750 PM KONYAR
430 INTERNATIONAL ECON MW 0200-0350 PM ASHEGHIAN
460 LABOR ECONOMICS TR 1000-1150 AM MACDONALD
475 PUBLIC FINANCE TR 1200-0150 PM NILSSON
540 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LA MW 1000-1150 AM TORUNO
Tentative SPRING 2016 SCHEDULE OF COURSES
# TITLE DAYS HOURS AM/PM INSTRUCTOR
200PRIN MICROECON MW 1000-1150 AM ASHEGHIAN
200PRIN MICROECON MW 0200-0350 PM ASHEGHIAN
200PRIN MICROECON TR 0800-0950 AM MACDONALD
200PRIN MICROECON ONLINE ALDANA
202PRIN MACROECON MWF 0800-0910 AM NILSSON
202PRIN MACROECON MWF 1040-1150 AM NILSSON
202PRIN MACROECON TR 0400-0550 PM KONYAR
202PRIN MACROECON ONLINE ALDANA
300INTERMEDIATE MACROECON MW 0200-0350 PM PIERCE
335TOOLS OF ECON ANALYSIS TR 1000-1150 AM MACDONALD
360ENVIRONMENTAL ECON TR 0400-0550 PM STAFF
410MONEY & BANKING MW 0600-0750 PM PIERCE
450GLOBAL ECONOMY MW 0400-0550 PM ASHEGHIAN
490ECONOMETRICS TR 0600-0750 PM KONYAR
500HIST ECON IDEAS MW 1000-1150 AM TORUNO
530THE GOOD ECONOMY MWF 1200-0110 PM NILSSON
